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I. INTRODUCTION
"I believe myself to be good, but find myself deceived. I
don't know why."' This chilling statement was written in a sui-
t J.D. Pace University School of Law. Assistant District Attorney, Bronx,
NY. The author would like to thank her husband, Richard, for all of his support
and encouragement. In addition, she thanks her parents, Angelo and Clarice
Branca, for always stressing the importance of education and for instilling within
her a deep-rooted sense of Italian culture and tradition which inspired her to write
this article. Finally, the author expresses her gratitude to the staff of the Pace
International Law Review for their patience and hard work.
1 Hon. Dominic Massaro, Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the Storia
Segreta (Secret History) exhibit in New York (Nov. 6, 1995), in 143 CONG. REC.
E1350-03, *E1350 (cited by Rep. Eliot Engel in his remarks in The House of Repre-
sentatives (June 26, 1997)) [hereinafter Remarks].
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cide note by Mr. Stefano Terranova in 1942 who, at the age of
65, leapt to his death from a three story building.2 At least
three other Italian-American men must have shared in Mr. Ter-
ranova's feelings of despair, for within a five-day period in Feb-
ruary of 1942, they all sealed their own fates. 3 Mr. Martini
Battistessa, age 65, threw himself in front of a passing railroad
train.4 Mr. Giuseppe Michele, age 57, used a butcher knife to
cut his throat. Mr. Giovanni Sanguenetti, age 62, hanged
himself.5
In a world filled with violence and death, events such as
these, although tragic, do not generally stir up too much atten-
tion. Suicides are all too common, and in light of the situation
of the United States in 1942, a country at war, these particular
suicides committed by Italians in Richmond, Vallejo, Stockton,
and San Francisco, went unnoticed.6 Perhaps, however, they
should not have been overlooked, for if they had been investi-
gated and reported at that moment, a grave injustice would
have come to the attention of the world. These men were not
simply disillusioned with life, nor had they been deceived by a
loved one; rather, they were "despondent over their shameful
status as enemies of their adopted country," the United States
of America.7
The plight of Japanese-Americans during World War II is
already etched as a black mark in the history of this country.
"Their forced internment is a tragic episode for which the gov-
ernment has apologized and paid compensation to the survi-
2 See id.; see also STEPHEN Fox, THE KNOWN INTERNMENT 1-2 (1990).
3 See supra note 1; see also Fox, supra note 2; Geoffrey Dunn, Male Notte
(Bad Night): The Untold Story of Italian Relocation During World War II, Santa
Cruz Public Libraries, California: Local History Articles and Photographs (visited
Oct. 16, 1997), at http://www.cruzio.com/sclibs/history/ww2/male.html (reporting
that suicides by Italians in the San Francisco Bay Area took place in the early
weeks of February, 1942).
4 See Remarks, supra note 1; see also Fox, supra note 2.
5 See Remarks, supra note 1; see also Fox, supra note 2.
6 See Remarks, supra note 1; see also Fox, supra note 2.
7 See Office of Congressman Eliot Engel, H.R. 2090 Wartime Violation of
Italian American Civil Liberties Act: Una Storia Segreta Fact Sheet (1997) (un-
published fact sheet) (on file with the office of Rep. Engel) (stating that "[alt least
four Italian Americans in California, despondent over their shameful status as 'en-
emies' of their adopted community, commit suicide.") (hereinafter H.R. 2090).
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vors."8 The plight of the Italian-Americans, on the other hand,
has, until recently, been neglected and even refuted.9 Commen-
tators have actually asserted that "the classification of 'Ameri-
can citizens of Japanese ancestry for the purpose of meeting the
dangers of sabotage can be challenged as under inclusive, be-
cause American citizens of Italian ancestry were equally under
the strain of divided loyalty."' 10
The New York Times, for example, asserted that "[t]he na-
tion was at war with Germany and Italy, of course, but there
were no moves to lock up any European Americans."" The fact
that commentators used Italian-Americans as an example of
the over-exclusivity of World War II classifications demon-
strates the extent to which the ordeal of the Italian-Americans
during that period was overlooked. 12 Contrary to popular be-
lief, Italian-Americans were also branded enemy aliens, told to
move out of certain areas, and in some instances, were also in-
terned in prison camps.' 3
This article focuses on the plight of the Italian-Americans
(predominantly those of the West Coast) during World War II
- their forced relocation, adherence to curfews, and intern-
ment. Part II will discuss briefly the assimilation of the Italian-
Americans in the first half of the century and their perception of
America. It will also discuss the buildup of World War II, and
the development of United States foreign policy during that pe-
riod, culminating with the decision of Franklin D. Roosevelt to
brand certain groups, enemy aliens. Furthermore, the differ-
ences in the plight of Italian-Americans and Japanese-Ameri-
cans will be evaluated. Part III sets forth the Wartime
Violation of Italian-American Civil Liberties Act,' 4 recently
signed into law by former United States President William Jef-
8 Secret of WWII: Italian-Americans Forced to Move: Were Branded Enemy
Aliens, (Sept. 21, 1997) http://www.cnn.com/US/9707/21/italian.relocation [herein-
after Secret of WWII].
9 See generally H.R. 2090, supra note 7. The fact sheet states that history
texts and newspapers continue to deny that Italian Americans were affected.
10 GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 638
(13th ed., University Casebook Series 1997).
11 Dirk Johnson, War Legacy: Japanese-American Diaspora, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
14, 1995, at A8.
12 See Secret of WWII, supra note 8.
13 See id.
14 H.R. 2090, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (enacted).
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ferson Clinton, which calls for an acknowledgment of, and an
investigation into, the injustices suffered by many Italian-
Americans during World War II.
An evaluation of the bill will be discussed in Part IV in light
of the government's powers during times of national emergency.
Especially relevant to this section will be the cases of Kore-
matsu v. United States15 and Hirabayashi v. United States,16
where the government's justifications for the violation of Japa-
nese-American civil liberties were set forth. The realistic
threats posed by the Italian-Americans will be assessed in light
of these cases with a particular emphasis on the activities of
Italian-Americans at that time.
In addition, the steps taken by the government post-Kore-
matsu to rectify the World War II injustices, in so far as they
could be rectified, will be assessed. They can provide a guide for
the desired amelioration of the plight of the Italian-Americans.
Part V concludes that the government must conduct a full-
blown investigation so that this truly unjust and forgotten pe-
riod of American history can finally be recognized and rectified.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Italian-American Assimilation
What It Means To Be Italian
The immigrant should never abandon his feelings of the value of
being an Italian... Keep alive, at all times, the use of your
mother tongue and the practice of your own institutions; bring up
your children in a love for your Fatherland and teach them the
language, history, and geography of Italy. And even if you as-
sume the nationality of the country in which you have settled,
never deny and never forget the sublime moral inheritance of
your ancestors and transmit to your descendants the sacred flame
of the love of the distant fatherland. Thus will you ever remain a
true son of that world-extensive and strong Italy.
Long Live Italy, Forever.' 7
15 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
16 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
17 Fox, supra note 2, at 7-8 (quoting PAUL RADIN, THE ITALIANS OF SAN FRAN-
CIsco: THEIR ADJUSTMENT AND AcCULTURATION 113 (1975)).
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This passionate, patriotic passage was distributed to the
many Italians who left their homeland to explore the land of
opportunity, the land of freedom, the United States of America.
They received this excerpt along with their passports so as to
remind them that "space and time placed no limit on their loy-
alty to the homeland.""' And, with these words, they departed.
Statistics reveal that between 1901 and 1950, approxi-
mately 3,736,405 Italian emigrated to the United States, most
of whom came from 1901 to 1920.19 This era is most commonly
referred to as the second great immigration stream.20 Califor-
nia, in particular, attracted many of these immigrants during
this time period. "By 1940, 100,911 foreign born Italians (now
about half of them naturalized) lived in California. This com-
pares with . . . 33,569 alien Japanese."2 1 Most were concen-
18 Fox, supra note 2, at 7.
19 See S. DALE MCLEMORE, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS IN AMERICA 78 (4th
ed., 1994). Table 4-4 on that page reflects the Italian Immigration to the United
States from 1820 to 1990. It reads:
Years Number
1820-1830 439
1831-1840 2,253
1841-1850 1,870
1851-1860 9,231
1861-1870 11,725
1871-1880 55,759
1881-1890 307,309
1891-1900 651,893
1901-1910 2,045,877
1911-1920 1,109,524
1921-1930 455,313
1931-1940 68,028
1941-1950 57,661
1951-1960 185,491
1961-1970 214,111
1971-1980 129,368
1981-1990 67,254
Total 5,373,108
Source: U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1990
Statistical Yearbook 1991: 48-50
20 See id. at 76. The author asserts that the second immigrant stream has
proved to be the high point of all immigration to America thus far, and that the
Italians were perhaps the most prominent group of newcomers at this time. See
id. at 76-77.
21 Fox, supra note 2, at 4.
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trated around the San Francisco Bay and other bay areas,
where many of the males made a living as fishermen.22
Whether or not the Italian immigrants were considered as-
similated depends upon what one believes the definition of as-
similation to be. "If assimilation means the casting off of all
vestiges of old-world culture and the speedy adoption of Ameri-
can citizenship," 23 then many would argue that the Italians in-
deed were not assimilated. On the other hand, if being
assimilated can be measured by "the integration of the immi-
grants into the American economy and the education of second
generation Italians in American values while retaining respect
for Italian tradition and culture,"24 then it could be effectively
argued that at least the second generation Italian-Americans
were in fact assimilated.
It is quite true that many Italians who came to the United
States did not readily become naturalized. 25 In fact, when
World War II broke out in 1941, forty two and a half percent of
the Italian immigrants living in the United States had not yet
obtained their American citizenships. 26 In California, slightly
more than half of the Italians remained unnaturalized.27 The
aforementioned patriotic passage distributed to these aliens
along with their passports 28 may have influenced many of them
to retain their Italian citizenship for fear of turning their backs
on the fatherland. Other factors that may have played a role in
the individual determinations of whether or not to become
American citizens included: "its necessity in [the immigrants']
daily lives, the time they could devote to preparation for the ex-
amination, their educational background, the war, their isola-
tion from native born Americans, and the extent to which they
felt "American" rather than Italian."29
22 See id.
23 Id. at 6.
24 Id.
25 See id. at 7.
26 See Fox, supra note 2, at 8.
27 See id.
28 See Fox, supra note 2, at 8.
29 See id. at 8-9. The author conveys, through various interviews, the atti-
tudes of many of the Italian immigrants regarding the acquisition of American
citizenship before the initiation of World War II. Many had not even received any
schooling in Italy prior to coming to the United States and therefore could not
study for the citizenship exam. Others were just proud to be part of America in
[Vol. 13:151
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Many of the immigrants then did not quickly adapt to the
American way of life. They did not fully understand the cul-
ture, they generally could not speak the English language well,
and most clustered together in ethnic communities. 30 Such
standards, however, may not in fact be the sole indicators of
assimilation. Rather, the argument has been made that true
assimilation can be judged by "the number of aliens who occu-
pied key economic positions as fishermen, . . . , laborers, or [by
the attitudes of those] who planned never to return to their
homeland, or believed that merely living in America made them
'American."' 31 If this is truly the definition of 'American,' then
the Italians were indeed assimilated, for many of them did in
fact occupy key economic positions as fishermen (fishing was
considered a national priority for the war effort) and shopkeep-
ers, and they did consider themselves to be American. 32 The
fact that they retained their old world traditions is merely a fac-
tor in assessing whether or not they could truly be considered
'true' Americans - a concept which in itself seems almost inca-
pable of proof.
The fact remains that one is classified as an immigrant pre-
cisely because he had to come from another country to make his
new life in the Unites States. In that sense, no immigrant can
ever be an "American" in the purest form. He must necessarily
have his roots in some other place. Unless the United States is
prepared to say that no cultures and traditions can be practiced
in America other than American traditions, then it cannot be
said that just because one retains old-world traditions, he can-
not be American.
and of itself and let the intricacies of citizenship fall to the wayside. The use of the
language among the immigrants was rampant and the cultures and traditions re-
mained in tact. Many simply hated the thought of giving up their Italian citizen-
ship, for they still harbored the basic love for Italy. Still others simply felt that
they did not need to obtain an American citizenship because they were only associ-
ated with other Italian Americans anyway. See id. at 9-20.
30 See id. at 20; see also MCLEMORE, supra note 19, at 79 (stating that the
Italians clustered in residential patterns exhibited perhaps the best by the various
Little Italys that developed in New York).
31 Fox, supra note 2, at 21.
32 See id.; see also James Brooke, After Silence, Italians Recall the Internment:
An Official Apology Is Sought From the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at A10.
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B. The Buildup of World War II and the Development of
United States Foreign Policy
It is difficult to believe that the Italians who came to the
United States in the early half of the century had any notion
that they would one day find themselves at war with their
homeland, but that reality began to set in with the global devel-
opments of the 1930's. Nazism was slowly advancing across Eu-
rope, 33 and the threat of war was becoming increasingly
realistic. Initially, United States President Franklin D.
Roosevelt was steadfast in his decision to promote peace. In his
address commonly known as the "Quarantine Speech", Presi-
dent Roosevelt asserted that it was his "determination to pur-
sue a policy of peace . . . [and] to adopt every practicable
measure to avoid involvement in the war."34
President Roosevelt, however, also realized that the politi-
cal situation of the world was such as to "cause grave concern
and anxiety to all peoples and nations who wished to live in
peace and amity with their neighbors."35 In fact, by January of
1938, President Roosevelt must have considered the world situ-
ation sufficiently grave that he made a recommendation to Con-
gress to increase armament for national defense. He reported
that in light of the increasing armaments of other nations, the
national defense of the United States was inadequate for the
purposes of national security and thus, an increase in arma-
ment was required.36 By September of 1938, it was apparent to
the President that "the fabric of peace on the continent of Eu-
rope, if not throughout the rest of the world, [was] in immediate
danger."37 Remaining steadfast in his convictions, however,
President Roosevelt continued to assert that it would be the pol-
33 See id. at 2.
34 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Chicago, Illinois [hereinafter
Quarantine Speech] (Oct. 5, 1937), reprinted in DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY: ADDRESSES AND MESSAGES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 24 (Kraus
Reprint Co. 1970) (hereinafter DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY).
35 Id. at 21.
36 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Recom-
mending Increased Armament for National Defense (Jan. 28, 1938), in DEVELOP-
MENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 34, at 25.
37 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message Sent to the President of Czecho-
slovakia and the Chancellor of Germany, and through the Secretary of State to the
Prime Ministers of Great Britain and France (Sept. 26, 1938), in DEVELOPMENT OF
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 34, at 30.
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icy of the United States to settle international disputes by pa-
cific means. 38 Nevertheless it soon became clear that peace was
not assured. 39
On September 1, 1939, Hitler's Germany invaded Poland,
and dashed all hopes for peace.40 World War II had begun.
Under Benito Mussolini, Italy officially entered the war as an
Axis power in June of 1940, with its declaration of war on Brit-
ain and France.41 Although the stated policy of the United
States was to "protect the neutrality, the safety and the integ-
rity of [the] country, [while] at the same time keeping [the coun-
try] out of the war,"42 that policy gradually began to shift from
one of neutrality to one of preparedness. 43 Preparation, how-
ever, did not aid the United States in thwarting the occurrences
of December 7, 1941 - the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.
44
The attack made it clear that the United States simply could
not remain neutral any longer.
"Always will we remember the character of the onslaught
against us."45 With these words, President Roosevelt asked for
the declaration of the existence of a state of war with the Japa-
nese Empire. Similarly, after Germany and Italy declared war
on the United States, he requested the recognition of a state of
38 See id.
39 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Annual Message to Congress, the
Capitol (Jan. 4, 1939), in DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, supra
note 34, at 32.
40 See 20 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 380 (1966).
41 See id. at 381, 385.
42 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address Before a Joint Session of the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives Recommending Revision of the Neutrality Law,
the Capitol, in DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 34, at
47. The change that the president was requesting, in the interest of real American
security and neutrality, was for Congress to take action with respect to the em-
bargo provisions of the Neutrality Act of 1935. Those provisions prevented the sale
to a belligerent by an American factory of any completed implements of war, but
they allowed the sale of many types of uncompleted implements of war, as well as
general material and supplies. Such products could be taken in American flag-
ships to belligerent nations, and the president felt that such allowances compro-
mised the traditional foreign policy of the United States, that of neutrality. See id.
at 49-50.
43 See THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 40, at 390.
44 See id. at 392.
45 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address Before a Joint Session of the Sen-
ate and House of Representatives Asking for the Declaration of the Existence of a
State of War with the Japanese Empire, the Capitol (Dec. 8, 1941), in DEVELOP-
MENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 34, at 125.
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war with those two countries, 46 remarking that "[t]he long
known and long expected has thus taken place."47 President
Roosevelt maintained that there had never been "a greater chal-
lenge to life, liberty, and civilization,"48 than that created by the
Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan. He was determined,
therefore, to have the "forces of justice and of righteousness
[prevail] over the forces of savagery and of barbarism."49
Suddenly, immigrants of the Axis power countries found
themselves at war with their homelands. But because they
were in America, the land of opportunity, and freedom, it is
doubtful that many of them imagined that their freedom would
be significantly limited. The America to which they had come,
however, found itself in a difficult and trying position. It was
now a country at war, a nation in crisis, a land confronted with
an emergency. 50 Many of the immigrants would soon realize
that these circumstances would indeed dramatically change
their lives in America.
C. The Impact of World War l on the Japanese and Italian
Americans
Many Americans, including the President himself, were be-
coming convinced that the greatest threat to national security
would come from within.51 The fear of "fifth columnists," aliens
who allegedly waited to strike on orders from the AXIS powers,
swept through the country.52 A California federal judge told
newly sworn citizens to "[b]e on the alert, because ... a democ-
46 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to the Congress Requesting
the Recognition of a State of War with Germany and Italy (Dec. 11, 1941), in DE-
VELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 34, at 133. That morn-
ing, Italy and Germany had declared war against the United States. See id.
47 Id.
48 See id.
49 Id.
50 See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address Over the Radio in Celebra-
tion of Washington's Birthday (Feb. 23, 1942), in DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 34, at 143 (declaring that "[i]n time of crisis when the
future is in the balance, we come to understand, with full recognition and devotion,
what this Nation is, and what we owe to it").
51 See Fox, supra note 2, at 2. The justifications for suspecting some groups to
be fifth columnists, and thus subjecting them to the status of enemy aliens will be
discussed infra Part IV. Part II.C will only discuss the factual distinctions be-
tween the treatment of Japanese and Italian Americans.
52 See id.
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racy like [the United States] . . . breed[s] what is known as the
fifth column, . . . some of [whom] now seek to harm [this coun-
try]." 53 In 1942, The United States served as the home for ap-
proximately 4,000,000 aliens, and shortly after the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor, 1,100,000 of these immigrants, who
were citizens of Germany, Italy, and Japan, were classified "en-
emy aliens." 54 Mr. Stefano Terranova's life would never be the
same.
55
Four pivotal dates in the lives of the so-called "enemy
aliens" were December 7, 1941; January 25, 1942, when the
government received pressure to act by the Roberts Commis-
sion; January 29, 1942, when the first enemy alien relocation
order was issued by the Justice Department; and February 19,
1942, when President Roosevelt signed the infamous Executive
Order 9066 authorizing the army to exclude anyone that was
deemed necessary to exclude from restricted zones along the
West Coast.56 In January 1942, Rep. John Tolan of Oakland
received a panic-stricken letter from one C.K. Schoell who
stated:
We one and all would like to see precious time saved, and poten-
tial danger removed by migrating the aliens, one and all to inte-
rior concentration camps, pronto. We Americans could lose this
war by continuing to be soft-hearted and soft-headed about Amer-
ican born Japs in particular, but Germans and Italians also ....
This is no time to weed out the sheep from the goats .... FEAR is
creeping more and more into the hearts of people we contact. So
let our government do something, definite, and now.57
On January 25, 1941, the Roberts Commission (headed by Su-
preme Court Justice Owen J. Roberts) released a report alleging
that "Japanese-Americans on Oahu had aided Japan's air as-
sault."58 It was with this report that the "cry to do something
53 Id. at 40 (quoting SAN FRANCIsCO CHRONICLE, Jan. 6, 1942, at 8).
54 See THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 40, at 410.
55 See supra Part I.
56 See Fox, supra note 2, at 41.
57 Id. at 42. (quoting Letter from C.K. Schoell to John H. Tolan (Jan. 19, 1942)
(on file with the University of California, Berkeley, Bancroft Library, file 67/14,
folder A12.052).
58 Fox, supra note 2, at 41 (quoting Report of the Select Committee Investi-
gating National Defense Migration, H.R. 1911, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942)).
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about the AXIS aliens on the mainland commence[d] in
earnest."59
California governor, Culbert Olsen told the commanding
general of the Fourth Army and Western Defense Command in
San Francisco, Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, that federal
action was imperative. 60 An informal meeting was set up to for-
mulate resolutions, and it was DeWitt's view that the army was
willing to take control of the aliens from the Justice Depart-
ment if he could be assured that the army would have the power
to force other agencies to cooperate. Congress acted on this
viewpoint and "unanimously approved a resolution calling for
the evacuation and internment of all enemy aliens and dual citi-
zens, regardless of the fact that their children may have been
American born."6 1 Just four days after the release of the Rob-
erts Commission report, the Justice Department announced
that, after consultation with General DeWitt, "all enemy aliens
would be required to vacate specified areas of the West
Coast."62 Finally, on February 19, 1942, in light of mounting
fears of a West Coast invasion, President Roosevelt issued Exec-
utive Order 9066 authorizing military leaders to "prescribe mil-
itary areas, and to impose restrictions on the movements of all
persons within those areas."63 The Order was characterized as
a national defense measure, 64 and was based on the premise
that "successful prosecution of the war require [d] every possible
protection against espionage and against sabotage." 65
1. The Plight of the Japanese-Americans
Pursuant to Executive Order 9066, 120,000 men, women,
and children of Japanese ancestry residing in the Western
United States, Americans and resident aliens alike, were sub-
jected to curfews, evacuation, and internment in detention
camps. 66 Curfew orders were implemented whereby individu-
59 Fox, supra note 2, at 41.
60 See id. at 42.
61 Id. at 43.
62 Id.
63 MCLEMORE, supra note 19, at 200.
64 See id.
65 Barry Sullivan, Justice at War, 60 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237 (1984) (book
review).
66 See id.
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als of alien status could not leave their places of residence be-
tween the hours of 8:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.67 Evacuation
followed in March of 1942. "The first destination of the evacu-
ees was a group of fifteen temporary assembly centers,... [and]
from [there], the evacuees were transferred to ten permanent
relocation centers."68 By November of 1942, more than 110,000
people of Japanese ancestry, over 70,000 of whom were Ameri-
can citizens "had been forced from their homes and imprisoned
without warrants or indictments."69 These people were re-
quired to leave behind everything that they could not carry, and
so, many of them sold their businesses, homes, and other pos-
sessions at "panic-sale" prices.70
Life in the detention camps was very difficult for the in-
ternees. The largest of the camps, Poston, consisted of three
units of barracks and other facilities intended to house approxi-
mately 20,000 people. 71 The evacuees faced many problems re-
lated to food, water, and housing, for the apartments were badly
constructed and small, that up to eight people were sometimes
forced to live in just one room. 72 Tensions mounted in the
camps and, consequently, there was an increase in stealing,
name calling, and violence. 73 Due to the unbearable living con-
ditions and resulting violence, an intensive investigation was
launched.
After an intense investigation into the treatment of the
Japanese-Americans and the reasons behind such treatment,
the Government realized that there was, in fact, no threat to
national security creating a military necessity sufficient to jus-
tify the actions against people of Japanese ancestry. 74 Accord-
ingly, in 1988, the United States government apologized to the
Japanese Americans interned during World War II and "started
paying reparations of $20,000 each to survivors."75
67 See MCLEMORE, supra note 19, at 208.
68 Id. at 200.
69 Id.
70 See id. at 203.
71 See id. at 204.
72 See MCLEMORE, supra note 19, at 205.
73 See id.
74 See id. at 209.
75 James Brooke, After Silence, Italians Recall the Internment: An Official
Apology Is Sought From the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 1997, at A10.
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2. The Plight of Italian-Americans
While many Americans are more than aware of the intern-
ment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, very few are
aware that the United States government also restricted the
freedom of 600,000 Italians who were legal residents of the
United States, some of whom were also American citizens.7 6 In
fact, just hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor, hundreds of
Italian-Americans previously classified as "enemy aliens" were
taken into custody by FBI agents. 77 "Less than two weeks later,
General DeWitt was recommending that all enemy aliens 14
years of age and older be removed to the interior."78 The FBI
xenophobe, J. Edgar Hoover, supported the measures. 79
By January 1942, the status of "enemy alien" was extended
to all aliens of Italian descent (approximately 600,000).80 These
individuals were all required to register and re-register at post
offices across the nation.8 1 In addition, they were forced to
carry photo identification booklets at all times, they were sub-
ject to various travel restrictions, and were required to hand
over "contraband" including cameras, weapons, flashlights, and
short wave radios.8 2 A 70 year old lawyer from Yonkers, New
York, John Romano, still remembers when FBI agents came
knocking on the doors of Italian-Americans in the middle of the
night during 1942.83 The agents claimed that they were looking
for transmitters.8 4 Mr. Romano remembers that "they were
76 See Hon. Dominic Massaro, Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the
Storia Segreta (Secret History) exhibit in New York (Nov. 6, 1995), in 143 CONG.
REC. E1350-03, *E1351 (cited by Rep. Eliot Engel in his remarks in The House of
Representatives (June 26, 1997)). For reference to the fact that American citizens
of Italian decent were also subject to the restrictions see Fox, supra note 2, at 155
where one of the author's interviewees stated that a very good friend of his, and
American citizen of Italian descent, was taken on the night of Dec. 7, 1941.
77 See H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
78 Dunn, supra note 3.
79 See id.
80 See H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
81 See id.
82 See id; see also Brooke, supra note 75 (explaining that [tihe police swept
through Italian-American neighborhoods in many cities, seizing from Italian citi-
zens firearms, radios, cameras and flashlights that could be used as signaling
devices.).
83 See Carl Weiser, Italian Americans Seek U.S. Apology, GANNErr NEWSPA-
PERS, July 21, 1997.
84 See id.
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cold as steel, . . . , and they scared the hell out of the
neighborhood."8 5
Ultimately, "about 1600 Italian-Americans were arrested,
250 (all Italian citizens) were interned in military camps for up
to two years, another 250 were excluded, that is, ordered to
move out of designated military zones, and 600,000 were forced
to submit to curfews and other restrictions on their freedom."8 6
Additionally, Italian language schools were closed, Italian-
American meetings became suspect, and Italian-American orga-
nizations, such as social clubs, were harassed.8 7
A typical indication that a certain area was designated as a
"restricted zone" was a sign resembling the following:
"ENEMY ALIENS PROHIBITED AREA NO. 28.
The United States Government requires all aliens of German,
Italian, or Japanese nationality to vacate this area."88
Pursuant to these restrictions, about 2,000 Italians had to move
out of Pittsburgh, a town on San Francisco Bay.8 9 These re-
strictions often meant that an individual might only be required
to move one block away to an area that had not been designated
as restricted. The scarcity of wartime housing meant that
many of those who were forced to relocate had much difficulty
finding a new place to live.90 One woman actually "took up resi-
dence in a chicken coop." 91 Frequently, those who were hardest
hit by the relocation orders were elderly grandparents who
would have to move out of their homes. 92 In fact, "Joe Aiello, a
United States resident for fifty-six years but still an Italian citi-
85 Id.
86 Rose Scherini, The Other Internment: When Italian-Americans Were Enemy
Aliens, AMBASSADOR, Fall 1993, at 11-12. Further restrictions included the closing
of Italian language schools and newspapers in northern California.
87 See Hon. Dominic Massaro, Remarks at the Opening Ceremony of the
Storia Segreta (Secret History) exhibit in New York (Nov. 6, 1995), in 143 CONG.
REC. E1350-03, *E1351 (cited by Rep. Eliot Engel in his remarks in The House of
Representatives (June 26, 1997)); see also Brooke, supra note 75.
88 Dunn, supra note 3.
89 See Brooke, supra note 75.
90 See Secret of WWII, supra note 8.
91 Id.
92 See Scherini, supra note 86, at 12.
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zen, was forced to leave his home in a wheelchair, and Placido
Abono was moved out on a stretcher at the age of 97."93
In total, establishment of the restricted zone along the Cali-
fornia coast subjected some 10,000 Italian Americans to evacua-
tion by February 24, 1942.9 4 Rosina Trovato, a classified enemy
alien, was one of those evacuees who could not believe what was
happening to her. Sadly, she received her notice to evacuate on
the very day that she learned that her son had gone down with
the U.S.S. Arizona in Pearl Harbor. 95
Naturalized citizens were also among those subject to the
restrictions. Nino Guttadauro, the business manager of a fish-
erman's association in San Francisco, was forced to leave the
area and find a job in Reno. 96 Seventy-year-old Ettore Patrizi,
editor-publisher of the West's major Italian language newspa-
per, L'Italia, had been a naturalized citizen since 1898.9 7 He
was hospitalized when he received the exclusion order and was
given permission to delay his departure only until he was re-
leased from the hospital.98 Sylvester Andriano, an attorney and
former member of the City's Police Commission and Board of
Supervisors, also received exclusion orders.99
It was reported that "the mass evacuation and resettlement
of as many as 200,000 enemy aliens from 86 forbidden zones in
California was being planned by the U.S. Government." 100 Dur-
ing a Senate hearing in March 1942, Senator Johnson indicated
that similar measures would have to be taken with regard to
the Italians on the East Coast,10 1 but the implications were not
as grave. The 500,000 Italians living on the East Coast were
93 Brooke, supra note 75, at A-10.
94 See H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
95 See Brooke, supra note 75.
96 See Scherini, supra note 86, at 14. Mr. Guttaduro's position as president of
the local branch of the Italian War veterans earned him the exclusion. See id. The
reasons why some individuals were subject to the restrictions will be discussed
further infra Part IV.
97 See id. Mr. Patrizios newspaper was pro-Fascist. See id. The viability of
the justification for restricting such individuals in the various way will be dis-
cussed further infra Part IV.
98 See id.
99 See id. [Mr. Andriano's] name was on the FBI's suspect list as head of the
Italian Language School, legal counsel for the Italian Consulate, and president of
the local Italian Chamber of Commerce. See id.
100 H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
101 See id.
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forced to carry identification cards and to report all job changes,
however, no moves were made to relocate them.10 2
Meanwhile, in California, curfews confined as many as
52,000 Italian enemy aliens to their homes between the hours of
8:00pm to 6:00am. 10 3 When they could leave their homes, they
were forbidden to travel beyond a five mile radius.'0 4 A man by
the name of Giuseppe DiMaggio could not even visit the San
Francisco restaurant of his son, Joe DiMaggio. 10 5 Additionally,
it is quite ironic these restrictions prevented many Italians
from "visiting their sons in the U.S. military who were assigned
to military installations."1 0 6
The restrictions also caused many Italian-Americans to
lose their jobs. Hit especially hard, were West Coast fishermen.
Approximately 1,400 Italian-American fishermen in San Fran-
cisco10 7 were prohibited from "fishing or even setting foot on the
San Francisco waterfront after February 24, 1942."108 For
those fishermen on the Santa Cruz Municipal Wharf, these re-
strictions were enforced immediately after the bombing of Pearl
Harbor.109 While some of the boats simply remained idle,110
about 90 percent of San Francisco's fleet, had to be surrendered
to the Coast Guard. Oddly, these restrictive measures were
taken despite the fact that fishing was considered a national
priority for the war effort.'1 1
Unlike the plight of the suicide victims mentioned earlier,
the plight of these fishermen received some attention. In a
front page article, the Santa Cruz Sentinel exclaimed, "Fisher-
men with 23 sons in Army and Navy Are Bound to Wharf While
102 See id.
103 See id.
104 See H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
105 See The National Italian-American News Bureau, Fact Sheet: Una Storia
Segreta; The Secret Story of Wartime Restrictions on Italians in The U.S. (1997)
(unpublished fact sheet) (on file with the National Italian-American Foundation)
[hereinafter NIAF].
106 Id. "During World War II, more than 500,000 Americans of Italian descent
served in the U.S. armed forces, constituting one of the largest segments of the
U.S. army that numbered 12 million." Id.
107 See FOX, supra note 2, at 68.
108 H.R. 2090, supra note 7
109 See Dunn, supra note 2.
110 See id.
111 See Brooke, supra note 75.
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Boats Lie Idle and Sea Food Is Needed."' 12 The government it-
self came under attack with an article reporting:
With its problems of separating fifth columnists from peaceful
and worth residents of foreign birth, the Department of Justice
has had no time to work out formulae which will safeguard the
nation and at the same time allow such men as Santa Cruz's fish-
ermen to earn a living for their families and add to the country's
food supply.113
Furthermore, DeWitt himself was confronted with opposition to
the restrictions. Malio Stagnaro, chief boatswain of the Navy
during the war, took a trip to San Francisco to confront General
DeWitt "about the hardships that his policies were creating."1 4
Mr. Stagnaro walked away from that meeting characterizing an
unmoved DeWitt as a "damn fool, . . ., a complete nut."" 5
Perhaps the harshest of all the restrictions, however, were
the internments. Beginning in 1939, President Roosevelt "had
placed the responsibility for espionage, counterespionage, and
sabotage in the hands of the FBI, the Military Intelligence Divi-
sion (G-2) in the War Department, and the Office of Naval Intel-
ligence (ONI) in the Navy Department."11 6 Part of this
responsibility entailed "compiling lists of those individuals
whom the government believed intended to harm the United
States" and, thus, should be arrested if war were to ensue." 7
After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, therefore, hundreds of
Italians who were previously classified under these lists as
"dangerous aliens" were taken into custody."18 Although each
internee was assured of a hearing in front of a three person
112 Dunn, supra note 3.
113 Id.
114 Dunn, supra note 3.
115 Id. Stagnaro stated:
I went up to DeWitt to try to talk to him, . and he wouldn't listen to
any reason whatsoever, to nothing. Everybody to him was an enemy that
wasn't an American citizen. I said, 'General, these are the greatest people
in the world.' 'Well! he says, why didn't they become citizens?' I said,
'General, they never had the opportunity; never had an opportunity to
learn; they raised big families and they stayed at home.'
Id.
116 Fox, supra note 2, at 152.
117 Id.
118 See H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
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board,1 19 some 250 of them, mostly all Italian citizens, were
shipped to internment camps at Missoula Montana and Ellis Is-
land without any counsel or trial, and they were not advised of
the charges against them.120 These Italians were deemed to be
sufficient security risks, justifying such confinement. 121 The
following letter written to a relative by one internee, Filippo
Molinari, depicts the process undertaken by the government:
I was the first one arrested in San Jose the night of the attack on
Pearl Harbor. At 11pm, three policemen came to the front door
and two to the back. They told me that, by order of President
Roosevelt, I must go with them. They didn't even give me time to
go to my room and put on my shoes. I was wearing slippers. They
took me to prison . . . and finally to Missoula, Montana, on the
train, over the snow, still with slippers on my feet, the tempera-
ture at 17 below, and no coat or heavy clothes!
1 22
The internees at Missoula divided along generational
lines. 123 The older men, who were usually long term United
States residents, were very bitter at having been ripped away
from their families.1 24 The younger men, however, many of
them sailors from twenty-eight Italian ships that were im-
pounded in American ports, viewed the camp as "a safe and
pleasant place to sit out the war."125 They even nicknamed the
camp "Bella Vista" (Beautiful View), for it was found at a "bend
on the Bitterroot River, where wildflowers carpet meadows that
stretch toward snow-capped mountains."
26
On October 12, 1942, Columbus Day, Attorney General
Francis Biddle announced that, "Italian nationals in the U.S.
would no longer be classified as 'enemies.""127 The move was
designed to generate political support for the war.' 28 President
Roosevelt knew that he needed the support of the Italian-Amer-
icans, the nation's largest ethnic group, in its fight against the
119 See Scherini, supra note 86, at 12.
120 See H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
121 See Brooke, supra note 75.
122 See Scherini, supra note 86, at 12.
123 See Brooke, supra note 75.
124 See id.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Dunn, supra note 3.
128 See id.
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Axis powers. 129 He also realized that the security measures be-
ing employed against Italian-Americans were counterproduc-
tive. President Roosevelt had particular need of the full support
of Italian-Americans for the impending invasion of Italy. 130 Af-
ter all, many of the Italian-American immigrants had sons
fighting in the United States' military. 131 In fact, "an estimated
500,000 Italian-Americans served in World War II. '132 There-
fore, Pursuant to Biddle's orders, General DeWitt "reluctantly
lifted all military restrictions on [the] Italians" of California. 133
"For decades, Italian immigrant families who lived through
World War II in the United States did not want to talk about
the curfews, confiscations of fishing boats, forced moves from
seacoast towns, police searches of their homes and internments
at Fort Missoula." 134 This reluctance to talk, explains why this
period of our nation's history has gone unnoticed. Or, perhaps
it is because no list of Italian internees has ever been found. 135
Unfortunately, "the archives are eerily silent about the exper-
iences of Italian. . . aliens during the four to eight months they
were removed from their homes and jobs." 136 The decision to
relocate them is recorded in rather "cold [and] impersonal de-
tail," but nothing indicates what the effects of the policy upon
the victims may have been.' 37 In fact, no documents reveal that
the aliens were moved. 138 Now, however, after fifty years of si-
lence, steps have been taken to bring this unfortunate chapter
of American history into the light.
III. H.R. 2442: WARTIME VIOLATION OF ITALIAN AMERICAN
CIVL LIBERTIES ACT
"Mr. Speaker, I rise today.., to introduce a bill that calls
on the President, on behalf of the United States Government, to
129 See Brooke, supra note 75.
130 See id.
131 See The National Italian-American News Bureau, Italian-Americans Rally
Support For Government Investigation of Civil Rights Violations During World
War 11 (1997) (unpublished fact sheet) (on file with the NIAF).
132 Id.
133 Dunn, supra note 3.
134 See Brooke, supra note 75
135 See H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
136 FOX, supra note 2, at xiii.
137 See id.
138 See id.
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formally acknowledge that the civil liberties of Italian-Ameri-
cans were violated during World War II."
13 9
In 1994, Mr. Lawrence DiStasi, a University of California
Berkeley history instructor, organized and displayed a histori-
cal exhibition entitled, "Una Storia Segreta: When Italian-
Americans Were Enemy Aliens." This exhibition describes the
plight of Italian aliens during World War 11.140 The traveling
exhibit has brought much attention to what happened to
Italians and Italian-Americans, and it has even sparked memo-
ries among viewers who find themselves suddenly reminded
that their own families were affected in some way by the gov-
ernment restrictions of World War 11.141 More importantly,
however, the exhibit has generated interest among politicians
including Congressmen Rick Lazio (R-Long Island, N.Y.) and
Eliot Engel (D-Bronx, N.Y.), quoted above, who together first
introduced H.R. 2090, (later H.R. 2442, 10 6th Cong., 1st Sess.,
and now Public Law No: 106-451) the "Wartime Violation of
Italian-American Civil Liberties Act," in Congress on June 26,
1997.142
The legislation details various findings, such as the many
governmentally imposed restrictions placed upon the freedom of
more than 600,000 Italian born immigrants in the United
States during World War II, the forced relocations of many such
immigrants situated in areas on the West Coast, and the ar-
rests and internments of hundreds of other Italian immi-
grants.' 43 The legislation also explains that during the war,
Italians were the largest foreign born group in the United
States, and explains that hundreds of thousands Italian-Ameri-
cans sacrificed their lives to defend the United States in the
war.144 Finally, the legislation spells out clear objectives sought
by its sixty Congressional co-sponsors.
139 Representative Eliot Engel, Remarks in The House of Representatives
(June 26, 1997), in 143 CONG. REC. E1350-03, *E1351.
140 Lisa Hayden, Italian and Italian-American Internment: Italians Seek Apol-
ogy For WWII Uprooting, CONTRA COSTA TIMES AND WEST COAST COUNTY TIMES,
July 1-3, 199, available at http://www.ccnet.com/suntzu75/eo9066/9066it-l.html.
141 See Brooke, supra note 75; see also Secret of WWII, supra note 8.
142 See H.R. 2090, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (enacted).
143 See id.
144 See id.
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The co-sponsors of the bill called upon former President
William Jefferson Clinton, to formally acknowledge the viola-
tion of the civil liberties of Italian-American during World War
11.145 In addition, they sought to encourage federal agencies to
support projects that would heighten public awareness of this
forgotten episode, and called upon the President and Congress
to provide direct financial support for a documentary film that
would be used to educate the public.146 Also, given that very
little is known about this period of American history, the spon-
sors "recommend[ed] the formation of an advisory committee to
assist in the compilation of relevant information regarding [the]
matter and related public policy matters,"1 47 and called upon
the Department of Justice to publish a report detailing the role
of the Government of the United States government in the un-
fortunate occurrence.
The impetus for the drafting of H.R. 2442 was the fact that
more than fifty years after World War II, there still existed no
official accounts of the episode regarding the Italian-Ameri-
cans.1 48 Although many of those people actually affected by the
various restrictions of Executive Order 9066 are no longer alive,
their family members want to make sure that what happened
will not be forgotten.149 Many hope that "by shedding light on
this unfortunate chapter of history, we can ensure that it does
not occur again."1 50
IV. ANALYsIs OF The Bill
A. The Government's Emergency Powers
It is generally agreed that the government may exercise ex-
traordinary powers during times of crisis in the name of na-
tional preservation. 15' Alexander Hamilton himself noted that,
145 See id; see also H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
146 See H.R. 2090, 105th Cong., 1st Sess. (1997) (enacted).; see also See H.R.
2090, supra note 7.
147 H.R. 2090, supra note 7.
148 See Secret of WWII, supra note 8.
149 See id.
150 The National Italian-American News Bureau, Italian-Americans Rally
Support For Government Investigation of Civil Rights Violations During World
War 11 (1997) (unpublished fact sheet) (on file with the NIAF) (quoting NIAF Pub-
lic Policy Chairman, John Calvelli, who is also Congressman Engel's chief of staff).
151 See STEPHEN DYcUS ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 547-48 (2d ed. 1997).
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"it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of
national exigencies, and the correspondent extent and variety of
the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. ' 152 To that
effect, the instrumentalities of the government must be flexible
enough to meet new situations, especially grave ones, as they
present themselves.
President Theodore Roosevelt was a staunch advocate of
the expansive view of the emergency power. He is often quoted
as saying:
Occasionally, great national crisis arise which call for immediate
and vigorous executive action, and in such cases, it is the duty of
the President to act upon the theory that he is the steward of the
people ... [The President has the] legal right to do whatever the
needs of the people demand, unless the Constitution or the laws
explicitly forbid him to do it. 153
Franklin Roosevelt was no less staunch and, in fact, he was
more revolutionary. With the Great Depression and his elec-
tion, presidential emergency powers experienced unprecedented
expansion.'5 4 Roosevelt said that "unprecedented demand and
need for undelayed action may call for temporary departure
from the Constitution."155 In fact, only the second emergency
proclamation in the nation's history was issued during the first
100 days of his presidency, and Congress ratified it in just three
days. 156 When the war first broke out in Europe in 1939, it was
not apparent that Roosevelt was acting under any perceived in-
herent power.' 5 7 By mid-1941, however, he began to adopt a
152 Id. at 548 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 23 (Alexander Hamilton)).
153 William C. Banks & Alejandro D. Carrio, Presidential Systems In Stress:
Emergency Powers In Argentina And The United States, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 42-
3 (1993) (quoting THEODORE ROOSEVELT, THEODORE ROOSEVELT: AN AUTOBIOGRA-
PHY 551-553 (1913)).
154 See Banks & Carrio, supra note 153, at 45.
155 Id. at 45 (quoting Franklin D. Roosevelt, Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933),
reprinted in 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 15
(1938)).
156 See id. at 45-6 (citing Proclamation No. 2039, 48 Stat. 1689 (1933) and
Bank Conservation Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 201-213 (1988)).
157 See id. at 46. The authors state that the President initially "extended mili-
tary and economic aid to the allies only on the basis of statutory authority, and
maneuvered U.S. armed forces for the strategic benefit of the Allies only in keeping
with the traditional discretion accorded the commander-in-chief." Id. (citing JOAN
M. JENSEN, ARMY SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 1775-1980, at 212-25 (1991)).
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broader interpretation of his powers. Defense plants, which
had experienced strikes halting production, were seized and op-
erated under his command, and an Office of Price Administra-
tion was established to examine proposals for the price fixing of
scarce resources. 158 Incidentally, both of these actions were car-
ried out without statutory authorization. 15 9
However broad the government emergency powers may be
deemed, it remains imperative that the instrumentalities of
government are not so flexible as to extend beyond its authority.
Such over extension, would likely cause a rupture in the legiti-
macy of the system. Although an emergency may present the
government with a situation where it must exercise powers not
ordinarily available to it, there must be a limit to even those
extraordinary powers. Such extraordinary power referred to in-
clude the governmental "authority to act in the domestic sphere
in ways that would be impermissible but for the existence of a
crisis." 60 When such a power is indeed exercised, the constitu-
tional basis should be carefully scrutinized. 161 The necessity for
limits on such governmental power is particularly clear when
war powers is invoked, for "it usually is invoked in haste and
excitement when calm legislative consideration of constitu-
tional limitation is difficult." 162 War powers, therefore, are po-
tentially the most dangerous of all governmental powers.
B. The Military Necessity Prompting The Actions Taken
Against Japanese-Americans
The bombing of Pearl Harbor created yet another emer-
gency to which President Roosevelt responded with very broad,
discretionary powers. Racial animus against the Japanese was
increasingly generated by important Japanese military victo-
ries in the Pacific.' 63 After President Roosevelt signed Execu-
tive Order 9066, General DeWitt "designated California,
158 See id. at 46 (citing EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POW-
ERS 1787-1957, at 245 (1957)).
159 See Banks & Carrio, supra note 153, at 46.
160 Dycus, supra note 151, at 548.
161 See id. (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146-7 (1948)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
162 See id. at 548 (quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 146-7
(1948) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
163 See Banks & Carrio, supra note 153, at 46.
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Washington, Oregon and Southern Arizona as military zones
and, to prevent sabotage and espionage,.., he ordered the relo-
cation of persons of Japanese descent residing in those ar-
eas."164 Notably 70,000 of more than 110,000 Japanese
descendants affected by the orders were U.S. citizens. 165 The
policies enacted against the Japanese-Americans during World
War II were deemed justified as a military necessity. The al-
leged basis for the measures was that "Japanese-Americans
were predisposed to disloyalty, sabotage, and espionage because
of their distinctive racial characteristics."1 66
The Japanese were believed to be a very organized, clan-
nish group that worked hard to maintain the Japanese lan-
guage and traditions of community and family life. 167 It is true
that the first generation Japanese immigrants, the Issei, fre-
quently had very strong ties with Japan. 168 Such findings
caused many to believe that the military threat to the West
Coast during World War II was real and, consequently, that
military necessity could justify the carrying out of the mass in-
ternment programs and the other restrictive measures insti-
tuted against Japanese Americans.' 69 General DeWitt himself
admitted, "it was not that there was insufficient time in which
to make loyalty determinations; it was simply a matter of facing
the realities that a positive determination could not be made,
that an exact separation of the 'sheep from the goats' was unfea-
sible."' 70 Thus, a military determination had been made upon
the basis that distinguishing the loyal from disloyal was not fea-
sible due to racial characteristics, and not because of any logis-
tical constraint.' 7 '
Despite the race-based nature of this classification, the dis-
tinction withstood judicial review. A student at the University
of Washington, Gordon Hirabayashi, intentionally violated both
164 Id. at 47.
165 See generally id.
166 Peter Irons, Justice At War: The Story Of The Japanese American Intern-
ment Cases, 82 MICH. L. REV. 887 (1984) (book review).
167 See MCLEMORE, supra note 19, at 201.
166 See id. at 192, 201.
169 See id. at 201.
170 Lawrence Kent Mendenhall, Note, Misters Korematsu And Steffan: The
Japanese Internment And The Military's Ban On Gays In The Armed Forces, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 196, 211 (1995).
171 See id. at 211.
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General DeWitt's evacuation order and his detention order,
and, Hirabayashi was convicted for his actions. 172 Without de-
ciding the more difficult issues of evacuation and internment,
the Supreme Court of the United States upheld Hirabayashi's
conviction for violating the curfew order. 173 The Court simply
concluded, "reasonably prudent men charged with the responsi-
bility of our national defense had ample ground for concluding
that they must face the danger of invasion ... ,,174 Chief Justice
Stone conceded that a greater danger may indeed be posed by
residents, legal or not, having ethnic ties with an invading en-
emy. 175 The decision legitimized racial discrimination by the
government when the security of the nation was perceived at
risk.
Fred Korematsu, like Hirabayashi, was an American citi-
zen of Japanese descent who was subjected to the exclusion
measures, despite the fact that his individual loyalty had not
been questioned.' 7 6 Korematsu's crime was his violation of the
exclusion orders, and the Supreme Court was pressed to decide
the issue of the constitutionality of the evacuation measures
that had been raised, but not formally addressed, in Hiraba-
yashi. The Court recognized that both convictions rested on the
"same basic executive and military orders, all of which orders
were aimed at the twin dangers of espionage and sabotage."1 77
The Court, however, also recognized that exclusion constituted
a far greater deprivation than did adherence to a curfew or-
der.178 Accordingly, the Court emphasized that all legal restric-
tions which curtailed the civil rights of any single racial group
were immediately suspect and subject to rigid scrutiny. 179 In
applying such a standard, the court noted that while "pressing
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such re-
strictions; racial antagonism never can."18 0 Nevertheless, the
172 See Arval A. Morris & Peter Irons, Book Review, Justice At War: The Story
Of The Japanese American Internment, 59 WASH. L. REV. 843, 851 (1984) (book
review).
173 See id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 105 (1943)).
174 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94.
175 See id. at 101.
176 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
177 Id. at 217.
178 See id. at 218.
179 See id. at 216.
180 Id.
[Vol. 13:151
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol13/iss1/5
INJUSTICE IGNORED
court found the exclusion order to be a proper exercise of con-
gressional and executive authority.18 ' It further agreed that
"the exclusion of the group as a whole was a military impera-
tive,"1 8 2 which justified the application of the orders to all eth-
nic Japanese, citizens or not. The fact that 5,000 American
citizens of Japanese ancestry had not signed loyalty oaths to the
United States seemed to aid the Court in accepting the mili-
tary's claim that a separation of loyal from disloyal Japanese
could not be accomplished.' 8 3 Thus, "despite its declared use of
strict scrutiny, the court declined to question seriously the mili-
tary's conclusions, accepting the military's judgment that the
refusal to sign loyalty oaths by a fraction of the Japanese af-
fected by the orders made exclusion a military imperative."18 4
The Court, however, rendered its decisions without knowl-
edge of the Office of Naval Intelligence's Ringle Report, a report
that was known to General DeWitt.'8 5 The report estimated
that fewer than three percent of Japanese Americans in the
United States would act as agents or saboteurs of Japan.18 6 Ex-
tensive research into the matter revealed that the Ringle Re-
port existed, and that there was no basis for the military
necessity justification.18 7 Thereafter, in January of 1983, Fred
Korematsu filed a coram nobis petition.188 The Court vacated
his conviction on the grounds of prosecutorial misconduct, in-
cluding "deliberately omitt[ing] relevant information and
181 See id. at 218-19.
182 Korematsu, 323 U.S at 219.
183 See id..
184 Lawrence Kent Mendenhall, Note, Misters Korematsu And Steffan: The
Japanese Internment And The Military's Ban On Gays In The Armed Forces, 70
N.Y.U. L. REV. 196, 209 (1995).
185 See Morris & supra note 172, at 852.
186 See id.
187 See Monroe Leigh, Domestic Sovereign Immunity - Statute Of Limitations
- Taking Clause - American-Japanese Evacuations Claims Act, 80 AM. J. INT'L
L. 648, 649 (1986). In 1980, Congress established the Commission on Wartime
Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) for the purpose of conducting an
investigation into the internment program. The CWRIC report, released in 1982,
concluded that there was no basis for the military necessity justification and that
the U.S. Government officials knew this at the time the internment program was
implemented and when the Hirabayashi case was briefed and argued before the
Supreme Court. See id.
188 See Philip Tajitsu Nash, John Tateishi's Moving For Redress And Justice
For All: An Oral History Of The Japanese American Detention Camps, 94 YALE L.J.
743, 751 (1985) (book review).
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provid[ing] misleading information in papers before the Su-
preme Court."'18 9 The omitted information was indeed critical
because it went directly to the heart of the military justification
argument.190
Japanese Americans were appropriated restitution for their
World War II internment via the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.191
The Act established many purposes, a number of which are very
similar to those sought by the drafters of the Wartime Violation
of Italian American Civil Liberties Act.' 92 Some of the objec-
tives of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 were to acknowledge the
injustices of the evacuation, relocation, and internment suffered
by the many Japanese Americans during World War II, to ex-
tend an apology for such injustices, to provide for a public edu-
cation fund to finance efforts to educate the public about the
injustices, and to make restitution to those who were in-
terned. 193 Thus, Congress admitted that the United States had
committed a tremendous injustice when it took such measures
against Japanese American citizens and permanent resident
aliens upon realizing that the government could not offer ade-
quate security justifications for its actions. 94
C. The Viability of H.R. 2442
Although H.R. 2442, now Public Law No. 106-451, seems to
be very similar to the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, it cannot be
said that Italian-Americans are claiming that their situation in
World War II was at all comparable to that of Japanese Ameri-
cans. "Italian... aliens and their families knew no Manzanar,
no Heart Mountain, no Tule Lake, and no fire sales."' 95 The
internment camp in Missoula in which many Italians were kept
was nicknamed Bella Vista, or Beautiful View.' 96 About one
hundred of the internees were entertainers, (taken from a lux-
189 Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406, 1420 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
190 See id. at 1420; see also Nash, supra note 188, at 751.
191 See 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988).
192 See H.R. 2090 supra note 7.
193 See 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988).
194 See Manjusha P. Kulkarni, Note, Application Of The Civil Liberties Act To
Japanese Peruvians: Seeking Redress For Deportation And Internment Conducted
By The United States Government During World War 11, 5 B.U. Pub. INT. L.J. 309,
322-3 (1996).
195 Fox, supra note 2, at xv.
196 See generally Brooke, supra note 75.
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ury cruise ship that was caught in the Panama Canal) who put
on shows such as operas and comedies about once a week.197
Furthermore, it does not appear that food was scarce, for the
staples of beef, sugar and, butter were plentiful at the camp. 198
In addition, the minimal evidence of the occurrence that ac-
tually exists indicates that most all of the Italian immigrants
who were subjected to the various restrictions were Italian citi-
zens, whereas at least two-thirds of the Japanese affected were
American citizens.1 99 Moreover, those Italians and Italian-
Americans who were arrested were individuals who the FBI
and other federal agencies had previously deemed dangerous to
American security.200 Most of those internees lived near the
coasts or defense installations. 20 1 To add to the differences, it is
important to note that "the anti-Japanese measures lasted the
length of the war, while the anti-Italian restrictions mostly en-
ded after less than a year."20 2
Various findings also indicate that the American citizens of
Italian descent who were subjected to the various measures
were, in some sense, pro-Fascist. For example, "all of the mem-
bers of the Italian War Veterans of World War I were either
interned or excluded." 20 3 The group was considered suspect be-
cause its headquarters was in Rome and because money was
being sent from the U.S. branch to Italy for war orphans and
widows. 20 4 In May of 1942, California's State Un-American Ac-
tivities Committee held hearings on alleged Fascist activities in
San Francisco, the testimony of which resulted in the exclusion
of at least twenty naturalized American citizens, men and wo-
men alike.20 5 Other American citizens who were affected by the
restrictions included the editor-publisher of a pro-Fascist Ital-
ian language newspaper, 20 6 and the head of the Italian Lan-
197 See id.
198 See id.
199 See id.
200 See Dunn, supra note 3.
201 Weiser, supra note 83.
202 Brooke, supra note 75.
203 Scherini, supra note 86, at 12.
204 See id.
205 See id.
206 See id. at 14. Ettore Patrizi was the editor publisher of, L'Italia. While the
papers "editorial stance had been strongly pro-Mussolini, [it] became pro-Ameri-
can after December 7, 1941." Id.
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guage School who was also the legal counsel for the Italian
Consulate and the Local Chamber of Commerce President.20 7
Thus, there do seem to be marked differences between the
plights of the Italian and Japanese immigrants during World
War II. Perhaps it can be argued by opponents of the Wartime
Violation of Italian American Civil Liberties Act that such dif-
ferences negate the necessity of the measures called for by the
law. In fact, the Justice Department of the United States has
already said that "since a relatively small group of ethnic...
Italians received exclusion orders, no further action is
necessary."208
The requests made by the drafters of the bill, however, do
not seem unreasonable, even in light of the findings regarding
the Italian ordeal. The full story of this episode has never been
revealed, and for many, telling the story is the main focus. No
restitution is demanded at this time, and no direct accusations,
at least in the text of the law, are being made.
Of course, in order to get at the entire account, an extensive
investigation will have to be conducted. The specially formed
committees will have to look into allegations that the civil
rights of many Italian-Americans were indeed violated, for
there was never any "indication that any of [the] enemy aliens
were engaged in any treasonous activity whatsoever."209 In-
deed, it has been claimed, "with no evidence of sabotage or spy-
ing, the measures came to be seen as counterproductive." 210 In
fighting such claims, the government will have to, among other
things, look seriously at the actual fifth column threat posed by
the Italians affected by the restrictions, especially those who
were subjected to the measures simply because they had not at-
tained the American citizenship status. Although it is clear
that before World War II there had been "an Italian-American
flirtation with Fascism, or more accurately, with Mussolini,"211
it is equally clear that most of the flirtation ceased almost im-
207 See id. Sylvester Andriano was a highly respected community attorney
who was a former member of the city's Police Commission and Board of Supervi-
sors at the time of his exclusion. See id.
208 Scherini, supra note 86, at 14.
209 Booke, supra note 75.
210 See id.
211 Fox, supra note 2, at 29.
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mediately when Mussolini joined forces with Hitler. 212 There,
of course, may have been small groups of Italians who could be
considered disloyal, as were the German Bundists, 213 but the
fact remains that the number may have been so small so as to
negate any need for across the board restrictions against the
Italians. Such facts would seem to be integral to the govern-
mental decision making process and, as seen in Korematsu,
they may be key in evaluating the justification of such
measures.
In addition, a due process argument exists. It is important
to consider that where hearings were held, internees were not
advised of the charges, nor did counsel represent them.21 4 Fur-
thermore, the government should be prepared to offer an expla-
nation for the division of families and for the loss of jobs, homes,
and business that resulted from forced adherence to curfews
and relocations. Research reveals that many fishermen lost
their boats, and hundreds more had to give up their jobs as bak-
ers, restaurant workers, and garbage men because of the cur-
fews. 215 These people want an explanation for their suffering
and, given that "the archives are eerily silent about the experi-
ence of Italian ... aliens during the four to eight months they
were removed from their homes and jobs,"216 such an explana-
tion seems warranted.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, it appears that many Italian-Americans simply
want the injustices imposed upon them during World War II to
be acknowledged and put in the history books. 21 7 The Wartime
Violation of Italian-American Civil Liberties Act does not stand
for the notion that the government had absolutely no right to
take such measures against the Italians. Rather, it is a call for
an investigation into the matter. 218 If the investigation called
for by H.R. 2442 reveals that a true military necessity did exist
so as to justify the various restrictions on civil liberties, then let
212 See id. at 30.
213 See id. at 36
214 See Scherini, supra note 86, at 12.
215 See Brooke, supra note 75.
216 Fox, supra note 2, at xiii.
217 See generally Weiser, supra note 83.
218 See H.R. 2090 supra note 7.
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that information be placed into the history books as well. The
true story should be revealed, not only for the sake of the Ital-
ian-American community in the United States, but also for the
sake of the United States government itself, lest a small scale
Korematsu controversy should develop.
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